Working Paper

This paper experimentally adapts a Public Good Game (PGG) to the environ-mental issue of waste management. Beside the traditional PGG, we implement a measurment of social preferences of the participants through a Social Value Orientation (SVO) test for an extended interpretation, by categorizing the individual’s preferences (altruistic, prosocial, individualistic and competitor) in a matter of resources allocation (Van Lange et al., 2007). Furthermore, the individual decision is analyzed by the impact of non-monetary (advice) vs. monetary incentives (sanction in the form of a tax, Andreoni (1993) within a group. Results show that if the advice increases the average level of individual contributions, the threat of sanction is more efficient to enhance cooperation. Moreover, we find, in contrast with Croson (2006) and her altruism hypothesis that low income individuals contribute in absolute value as much as the higher income ones


The transition to cleaner transportation systems is crucial for addressing air pollution and mitigating climate change. Despite technological advancements, the adoption of alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs), including hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs), remains limited, particularly in markets like France. This study investigates consumer attitudes and preferences toward AFVs, focusing on hydrogen vehicles as a promising solution for sustainable mobility. By analyzing survey data from 4,593 French respondents, we evaluate the factors influencing consumer choices among electric, hybrid, and hydrogen vehicles. Using Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA), LASSO, and multinomial logit (MNL) regression techniques, the study identifies the determinants of vehicle adoption, including vehicle price, fuel price, brand preference, and environmental concerns. The results reveal that high vehicle prices and fuel price sensitivity are significant barriers to hydrogen vehicle adoption, while CO2 emissions strongly drive preferences for electric and hybrid vehicles. Additionally, the preference for foreign brands highlights the need for domestic manufacturers to improve competitiveness in the hydrogen vehicle market. The findings suggest that targeted subsidies, infrastructure development, and educational campaigns are essential to overcoming these barriers. In particular, expanding hydrogen refueling stations and raising awareness about hydrogen’s environmental benefits could foster broader consumer acceptance. This research contributes to the design of effective energy transition policies, emphasizing the role of government support, industry innovation, and consumer education in advancing the hydrogen vehicle market in France.


The central issue of this paper is to understand how policy makers can design instruments to create incentives towards green mobility. With this in mind, we ran a field experiment in 89 French firms (both public and private organizations) over 54 weeks to investigate how nudges and financial incentives can decrease the use of polluting vehicles by employees during their commute to work each week. Based on data including 845 employees, our study highlights several results related to three important attributes of policy design: the type of instrument, the timing and the targeting. We find that individuals exposed to the nudges “Moral Appeal”, “Risk of Loss”, and a combination of these two, significantly decrease their use of polluting vehicles in their daily commute to work. We find no treatment effect, either for the other nudges or for the impact of financial incentives. Our findings also reveal a persistent effect in time of the three successful nudges on the transport behavior of employees. Using a causal forest method to evaluate the heterogeneous treatment effects of these three nudges, we demonstrate that distance from work and pro-environmental behavior are the strongest predictors of treatment effects. We find that the further the employees reside from their workplace, the lower the treatment effect estimates. It suggests that selective targeting can improve the efficiency of the nudging policy.